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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, because of the widely accepted belief in the “right
to know” information of public concern, freedom of speech generally overrides public figures’ right to privacy. As a result, public figures have almost
no right to privacy, even when the published information is false. The digital era brings new threats to public figures’ privacy and invokes the need to
rethink this norm. We agree with the notion that public figures, by virtue
of their position in society, waive a substantial part of their right to privacy
when there is an important and legitimate purpose behind informing the
public of certain information. However, we depart from the United States’
legal norm by maintaining that, unders certain conditions, public figures
should be able to enjoy a right to privacy similar to that afforded to private
citizens. In support of this proposition, we have developed a Three Principle Filtering Model, to be used in determining whether or not the rationale
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for publishing information about public figures is legitimate and hence
should be allowed or prohibited. The Three Principle Model requires an
analysis of (1) the relevancy of the private information to the public and (2)
whether access to the information is necessary for imparting knowledge,
and then the application of (3) a proportionality rule. We argue that the
current legal norm in the U.S. is excessively permissive, allowing virtually
any publication about public figures and too often resulting in the exposure
of private information to an extent that is neither reasonable nor legitimate.
Our model, while accepting the public right to know (unlike other models),
better balances this right against competing values. It also sheds light on
the debate surrounding the privacy of public figures from different angles
than those examined by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court’s
rulings on public figures were shaped by defamation cases and sound mainly in First Amendment issues, emphasizing freedom of expression and freedom of the press. This perspective sets the public and the press as protagonists, whereas our model, focusing on the issue of privacy, locates
individuals at the center of the discourse. Moreover, the prevailing privacy
norm is based on liberal conceptions, whereas our approach is more
grounded in personality theories that enable a “balloon” of privacy, even
within public domains, including cyberspace. The Supreme Court did not
account for the digital era when shaping its tests. Our model is not based
on any specific jurisdiction and can be implemented worldwide.
We argue that when the public’s only interest is to invade privacy for
the sake of curiosity (snooping, gossip or perverted behavior), where the information does not carry any valuable influence over the person looking for
the information—publication of private information about public figures
will not be justified. Further, the joy people obtain from invading someone
else’s private and intimate life does not justify the harm to that person’s privacy, and allowing this kind of invasion contradicts the fundamental values
of freedom, autonomy, and dignity.
Our proposed model may help policy makers in the process of filtering
between justified and unjustified publications of private information about
public figures, while preserving space in their balloon of privacy.
Part I addresses the problem that the digital era brings into the discussion of public figure privacy. Part II defines public figures and analyzes the
varying definitions of private information as it pertains to this article’s discussion. Part III offers a background on the right to privacy and its origins
in the U.S. legal system. In particular, it describes U.S. privacy law in the
context of the First and Fourth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. This
discussion includes a contrast with the European approach, which differs by
focusing on personal dignity and, hence, personal control over one’s public
image. Part IV presents the new Three Principle Filtering Model for determining what information about public figures should be protected. Fi-
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nally, Part V discusses the legal tools needed to implement the proposed
Three Principle Filtering Model.
I. PRIVACY OF PUBLIC FIGURES IN THE DIGITAL ERA
When movie star Jennifer Lawrence, who rose to fame for her portrayal
of the heroine in the popular Hunger Games films, uploaded photos to her
iCloud account, she never paused to consider that they could be considered
fair game by a relentless media eager to capitalize on her fame. But in September, 2014, hackers targeted her account and, to their delight, found,
and were able to download and republish, the actress’s private photographs, including, to Ms. Lawrence’s utter dismay, a number of private
nude photos.2 The incident sparked controversy, drawing attention not only to the vulnerabilities of Apple’s virtual data storage service and the Internet in general,3 but also to the old debate as to whether or not people whose
fortunes are based on their fame and public image have any right to keep
any part of their lives private.4
The conflict between the public’s right to have access to information, on
the one hand, and, on the other hand, individual privacy rights has been
magnified in the digital age by the intensive use of the Internet. Its usage
has emerged as a primary source of information for a tremendous number
of people who interact daily on a massive scale via a variety of social media
platforms.5 These tools include wall posts, tweets, hash-tags, photo tagging,
and the ability to share pictures, videos, and music.6 During the past decade the ascendance of Big Data, tsunami of data security breaches, broad
internet access, growth of Internet behavioral marketing, and proliferation

2

3

4

5
6

Andrea Peterson, Emily Yahr & Joby Warrick, Leaks of Nude Celebrity Photos Raise Concerns About
Security
of
the
Cloud,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
1,
2014),
http://www.mudesign.net/webdesign/stolen_photos.pdf.
See, e.g., Issie Lapowsky, We’d All Benefit if Celebs Sue Apple Over the Photo Hack, WIRED (Sept. 4,
2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/09/law-apple-photo-hack/ (noting that some legal and cybersecurity experts have called for a lawsuit over the 2014 hack in order “to push Apple and other online companies to more aggressively protect the people using their services”); Susannah Guthrie, Hack Job: JLaw and the Risks of iCloud, THE NEW DAILY (Sep. 1, 2014),
http://thenewdaily.com.au/life/2014/09/01/hidden-risks-icloud-jennifer-lawrence/ (warning
that “[e]veryone who uses the iCloud is vulnerable to . . . hacking”); Laurel O’Connor, Celebrity
Nude Photo Leak: Just One More Reminder That Privacy Does Not Exist Online and Legally, There’s Not Much
We
Can
Do
About
It,
GGU
L.
REV.
BLOG,
Paper
30
(2014),
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggu_law_review_blog/30 (noting that the 2014 iCloud leak
“was the largest leak of its kind to happen all at once”).
Cover Exclusive: Jennifer Lawrence Calls Photo Hacking a “Sex Crime,” VANITY FAIR (Oct. 7, 2014, 8:54
AM), http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2014/10/jennifer-lawrence-cover?mbid=social_twitter.
Millions, if not billions, interact online using social media every single day. JOSÉ VAN DIJCK,
THE CULTURE OF CONNECTIVITY: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF SOCIAL MEDIA 4 (2013).
Id. at 3–4.
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of tracking technologies have come to influence everyone's life—and, according to this paper, ordinately affect public figures, about whom the public is not just eager to swallow every detail but also has asserted a sense of
entitlement, a right to know, especially in the U.S..7
“We are in the midst of an information revolution,” the implications of
which “we are only beginning to understand.”8 Once data is posted on the
web it becomes eternal (despite the Google Spain court decision on the socalled right to be forgotten, which, technologically, cannot be fully implemented).9 The fact that online publications can reach a virtually infinite
amount of users all around the globe coupled with the possibility that data
might be everlasting invites policy makers to consider finding a better balance between these two conflicting rights in general. More specifically,
publications that remain for many years appear at the forefront of the conflict. In other words, we should reconsider traditional legal norms about
the (almost) absolute right of the public to know as it conflicts with the personal privacy concerns of public figures by giving more deference to the latter. When doing so, we should think about new tools, recognizing and legitimating both conflicting interests and helping us distinguish between
legitimate and illegitimate uses of private information (including photos) affording some semblance of privacy, even to public figures.
This article will suggest a model, based on modern tools, which challenges the existing court decisions and better balances the classically conflicting rights of privacy and free expression.
The Model goes along the justifications given in the Terry Gene Bollea
(known publicly by the name Hulk Hogan) trial against Gawker Media,
which provides an example of right to privacy case in an online context. In
that case, the Sixth Judical Circuit of Florida protected the right to privacy
of Hogan—a well known public figure—and granted him more than 115
million dollars in damages following the publication of a sex tape on Gawker’s website, even though Hogan had made his sex life public in many other

7

8
9

See Scott J. Shackelford, Fragile Merchandise: A Comparative Analysis of the Privacy Rights for Public Figures, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 126 (2012) (noting that there has been “an increase in privacy violations, facilitated by new advanced surveillance technologies, which are feeding the appetites of
people who want to know more about public figures of all types”); Daniel J. Solove, Introduction:
Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1881 (2013) (explaining
that, given the volume of data-collection practices, it is impossible for individuals to effectively
manage their own privacy).
Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2001).
Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Case C-131/12, E.C.R., ¶ 100(4)
(May 13, 2014) http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&docid=152065.
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instances. The court held the website liable for violating the public figure’s
privacy and publicity rights when posting the tape in the Internet.10
II. A PUBLIC FIGURE – WHO ARE YOU?
A. Can Anyone Be a Public Figure?
Recently, Rolling Stone Magazine published an interview by actor Sean
Penn of a notorious drug lord known as “El Chapo,” calling him “the most
wanted man in the world.”11 Consider the similarities—and differences—
between either the author or the subject of this interview and an innocent
person who involuntary was the victim of a crime or a happenstance bystander at a demonstration, accident site, or other newsworthy location.
Despite the differences in choices made by each, all of them—the Hollywood film actor, the international criminal, and the involuntary victim of
circumstance—are all equivalently considered public figures, subject to exposure of their public as well as personal lives in the eyes of the law.12
We find that the answer to the question, “Can anyone be a public figure?”
is absolutely positive. This means that any one of us could suddenly be facing
the consequences of exposed private details about our lives without any control.
The U.S. courts have used a great many examples to define the category
of “public figure,” including, but not limited to: (1) celebrities (i.e., people
from the entertainment sector);13 (2) those holding or formerly holding pub-

10

11
12

13

Bollea v. Gawker Media LLC, No. 522012CA012447, 2016 WL 4073660, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
June 8, 2016) (declaring final judgment against Gawker). A few months after the decision, Gawker filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy, and the case subsequently settled. Sydney Ember, Gawker and
Hulk
Hogan
Reach
$31
Million
Settlement,
N.Y. TIMES
(Nov.
2,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/business/media/gawker-hulk-hogansettlement.html?_r=1. Relatedly, consider the argument posed by President Donald Trump during his campaign that the U.S. should reform libel laws to make it easier to sue news organizations, a task that’s at least a bit more difficult than the President made it sound. Adam Liptak,
Can
Trump
Change
Libel
Laws?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
30,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/us/politics/can-trump-change-libel-laws.html (arguing
libel law is a state-law tort, and the president cannot change them).
Sean Penn, El Chapo Speaks: A Secret Visit with the Most Wanted Man in The World, ROLLING STONE
(Jan 9, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/el-chapo-speaks-20160109.
See Jeffrey Omar Usman, Finding The Lost Involuntary Public Figure, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 951, 952
(claiming that “involuntary public figures” as category of individuals in American defamation and
First Amendment jurisprudence “has become lost”).
See, e.g., Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1141 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Entertainers
can therefore be public figures for purposes of a publisher’s . . . First Amendment defense to a
charge of false-light invasion of privacy.”); Ann-Margret v. High Soc’y Magazine, Inc., 498 F.
Supp. 401, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“There is little doubt that the plaintiff, who has starred in numerous movies and television programs over the last decade or so, is, as the term has come to be
understood, a ‘public figure.’”).
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lic office, including politicians and other elected officials;14 (3) criminals;15 (4)
inventors, researchers, and academics;16 (5) war heroes;17 (6) figures from the
news;18 and (7) unwilling or unexpected public figures (e.g., someone who
was at the scene of a crime or in a demonstration),19 amongst others.20
The definition of public figure is so broad that the group of public figures (who might suffer from being an open book to the public) includes not
only future public figures, who one day after many years might be public figures but also third parties, such as relatives of people who might become public figures in the future. The case of Friedan v. Friedan is one of the best examples. In this case, Betty Friedan’s husband was declared as public figure,
retrospectively, regarding information from twenty-five (25!) years before
she became famous as a feminist leader.21
The U.S. legal definition of “public figure” includes those involved in
past and contemporary events that might capture the public interest.22
Even after many years have gone by, one-time public figures “hold” their
14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21
22

See, e.g., Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (stating that politicians who have
become household names are “deemed public figures for all purposes” because they “occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence”); Biskupic v. Cicero, 756 N.W.2d 649, 657 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a former Wisconsin district attorney remained a public figure after
his term as a public official ended because of ongoing publicity surrounding his actions, both
while he was district attorney and afterward).
See, e.g., Marcone v. Penthouse Int’l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1085 (3d Cir. 1985)
(“Although the criminal activity, by itself, may not create public figure status, such activity may,
nevertheless, be one element in a mix of factors leading to that classification.”); Rosanova v.
Playboy Enters., 580 F.2d 859, 860–61 (5th Cir. 1978) (determining Plaintiff was a public figure
in a case where an article referred to him as a “mobster”).
See, e.g., Thompson v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 193 F.2d 953, 954 (3d Cir. 1952) (holding that an inventor became a public figure after patenting an invention, analogizing to a playwright publishing a
play); Carlisle v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc. 20 Cal. Rptr. 405, 414 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (labeling
“actors and actresses, professional athletes, public officers, noted inventors, explorers, [and] war
heroes” as public figures).
See, e.g., Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 238 P.2d 670, 672 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (“We
think that men who are called to the colors subject their activities in that particular field to the
public gaze and may not contend that in the discharge of such activities their actions may not be
publicized.”); Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950) (explaining that “plaintiff became a national figure in connection with” his heroic deeds as an “assistant pharmacist’s mate in the United States Coast Guard”).
See, e.g., Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that public figure status
could be achieved by inviting media attention in publicizing a purported affair with a prominent
political leader). Gennifer Flowers, the plaintiff, held a press conference where she played audio
recordings of intimate phone calls from then-presidential-candidate Bill Clinton that she had secretly taped. Id.
See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (“Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public
figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare.”).
For a discussion of additional court decisions, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 860 (5th ed. 1984), and LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 873 (2d ed. 1988).
Friedan v. Friedan, 414 F. Supp. 77, 78–79 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
See Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
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status, enabling open access for the public to gain private information about
one’s life in patronage of U.S. law. The seminal 1940 case of James Sidis is
a good example.23
Sidis was a gifted (genius) child raised up by his father to be so.24 He
spoke many languages before other children learned how to speak, lectured
mathematicians on the topic of four dimensional bodies when he was eleven
years old and graduated from Harvard when he was sixteen.25 He suffered
tremendously from public attention, leading to a nervous breakdown most
likely caused by all the unwanted attention. He escaped publicity by moving
away and starting a private simple life (working with adding machines and
other simple tasks) instead of being the genius professor at Harvard and
granting the world great scientific achievements.26 However, the media kept
on haunting him for many years and eventually published an article titled
Where Are They Now? featuring Sidis as “the unwilling subject of a brief biographical sketch and cartoon printed in The New Yorker weekly magazine.”27 Sidis brought suit against The New Yorker. The Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari to review an opinion of the Second Circuit that set
forth the doctrine of the permanent public figure, which has not dramatically changed over the years since.28 In the Second Circuit opinion, Sidis was
dismissed as a public figure with no right to challenge personal publicity.
Judge Charles Edward Clark expressed sympathy for Sidis, who claimed
that the publication had exposed him to “public scorn, ridicule, and contempt”29 and caused him mental problems—but found that the court cannot
give “all of the intimate details of private life an absolute immunity from the
prying of the press” based on the high value placed on freedom of speech.30
The cases that address public figures have done little over the last century to change the problematic concept of the permanency of public figure
status with its attendant lack of privacy protection. “One who has achieved
public figure status finds it nearly impossible to shed. More importantly,
the retention of public figure status presents incredible hurdles for defamation and privacy plaintiffs.”31
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id.
Samantha Barbas, The Sidis Case and the Origins of Modern Privacy Law, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 21,
26 (2012).
Olympia R. Duhart, When Time Stands Still: An Argument for Restoring Public Figures to Private Status, 27
NOVA L. REV. 365, 365, 382 (2002).
Barbas, supra note 24, at 21.
Sidis, 113 F.2d at 807.
Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 311 U.S. 711, 711 (1940) (denying certiorari); see also Barbas, supra note
24, at 66–67.
GINI GRAHAM SCOTT, THE DEATH OF PRIVACY: THE BATTLE FOR PERSONAL PRIVACY IN
THE COURTS, THE MEDIA, AND SOCIETY 148 (2011) (citation omitted).
Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809; Duhart, supra note 25, at 366–67, 384–85 (discussing the problem of privacy of one-time public figures and presenting a test for restoring them to private status).
Duhart, supra note 25, at 384–85; see also Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809.
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Over the years the U.S. Supreme Court has added to its definition of
public figures. Starting with the Gertz case and in cases that followed, the
Court considered several components to arrive at the definition of a public
figure.32 The Court construed the definition case by case with different figures, developing a few main components of its definition of a public figure:
First, access and control over the media.
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the
channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy.
Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.33

Second, enrollment in a special role in the public eye. “Public Figures are persons holding public office and/or using public resources and, more broadly
speaking, all those who play a role in public life, whether in politics, the
economy, the arts, the social sphere, sport, or in any other domain.”34
An individual who decides to seek governmental office must accept certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of
closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case. And society’s interest
in the officers of government is not strictly limited to the formal discharge of official duties . . . . Those classified as public figures stand in a similar position.35

According to the Court’s analysis in Gertz, Gertz did not meet this second component of the test. Neither did he have access to media in the
manner that public figures and officials usually enjoy, nor had he invited
the risk of publication, associated with close public scrutiny. Being an attorney, he did not discuss the case with the media and therefore lacked the
opportunity to rebut claims.36

32

33
34
35

36

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 325, 344–45 (1974) (discussing 1968 case in which a
Chicago policeman named Nuccio shot and killed a youth). Elmer Gertz, a famous Chicago attorney, had been hired by the victim’s family for their case against the police. Id. at 325. Gertz’s
role in the civil suit against the police officer prompted an article in the American Opinion,
which accused Gertz of being “an architect of [a] ‘frame-up’” of policeman Nuccio and stated
that Gertz had a criminal record, labeled Gertz “Leninist” with longstanding communist affiliation, and claimed he was an official of the “Marxist League for Industrial Democracy.” Id. at
326. The statements contained serious inaccuracies and falsehoods. Gertz sued for libel. Id. at
327. For additional discussion of some of the Court’s considerations in Gertz, see also Ernest D.
Giglio, Unwanted Publicity, the News Media, and the Constitution: Where Privacy Rights Compete with the
First Amendment, 12 AKRON L. REV. 229, 238 (1978). And for explanation as to why injury to official reputation is not protected, as well as considerations weighing in favor of and against limiting liability of news outlets, see GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 139, 143
(1999).
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
Eur. Parl. Ass., Right to Privacy, 24th Sess., Res. No. 1165 (1998); Shackelford, supra note 7, at 128.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344–345; Carol Anne Been, Note, Public Status Over Time: A Single Approach to the
Retention Problem in Defamation and Privacy Law, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 951, 954–55 (“[A] public figure is one who has assumed a role of special prominence in society and thus invites public scrutiny and the accompanying risks.”).
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352 (affirming the trial court’s refusal to characterize Gertz as a public figure.)
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Third, willingly (voluntarily) choosing to engage in a public role, inviting invasion of
privacy risks.37 “[T]hose classed as public figures have thrust themselves to
the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved,” thereby inviting “attention and comment.”38
The ethics code of professional journalists cautions: “Realize that private people have a greater right to control information about themselves
than public figures and others who seek power, influence or attention.”39 Consequently, media must weigh the consequences of publishing or broadcasting
personal information.
Rape victims are an excellent example of figures that, although meeting
the criterion of enrollment in a special role in the public eye, neither meet
the criterion of willingly (voluntarily) choosing the engagement in a public role nor of
having control over the media (like a president candidate). Therefore, a decision holding that a rape victim’s claim of invasion of privacy against a
newspaper for publishing her name was barred by the First Amendment is,
in our view, erroneous.40
Fourth, public controversy. Discussing a publication about the divorce of
Russell Firestone, a member of one of America’s wealthiest families, the
Court held that the issue of the dissolution of a marriage was not a type of
“public controversy” and therefore would be considered a private rather
than public figure.41
We claim that these definitions are too broad and in many ways lack legitimacy because they don’t distinguish between “true” public figures and
any others. In the present scheme, everyone has potential to be considered,
in one way or another, a public figure. Instead, we suggest that a person is
a public figure if he or she meets the criteria as one who may influence the
public in general or any group per se. General interest in a public figure is
a measure of the potential influence this figure has, or might have, on the
public.42 A variety of reasons might arouse interest in the public figure,
37
38
39
40
41

42

See id. at 345.
Id.
SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS (Sept. 6, 2014, 4:49 PM),
https://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (emphasis added).
See Fla. Star v. B. J. F., 491 U.S. 524, 535–36 (1989). It is also wrong based on the proportionality test.
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 450-55 (1976) (holding that Time magazine erroneously
reported that the divorce was granted on the grounds of adultery). Mrs. Firestone sued the magazine for libel. Id. at 452. Part of the final judgment alluded to wild allegations that surfaced during divorce proceedings: testimony given on the defendant’s behalf described the plaintiff’s “extramarital escapades” that “were bizarre and of an amatory nature which would have made Dr.
Freud’s hair curl.” Id. at 450; see also Duhart, supra note 25, at 374–75 (noting that the Time, Inc.
Court “rejected the public status of the plaintiff, applying the controversy standard”).
For different definitions, see KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, at 859–60 (“A public figure . . . . includes . . . anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention is focused upon
him as a person.”).
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such as his or her achievements, reputation, lifestyle, profession, and position or role in the public eye. These facts can give the public a legitimate
interest in learning more details about the public figure, including his or her
comments, omissions, activities, habits and behavior (or misbehavior).43
We contend that the interest in access to private information about public figures is legitimized by cumulative factors: (1) the public figure’s potential influence (whether direct or indirect) on members of the public, and (2)
the value and impact of the information on the public if exposed. We claim
that when the data is relevant, the public has a legitimate right to know this
information. We further argue that in the U.S., the “right to know” and
freedom of speech generally override public figures’ right to privacy. In the
case of a conflict between the two, revealing more traditionally private information than one normally would have is justified. Still, one has to designate some limits to avoid publication of data regarding public figures that
do not meet certain criteria, such as the relevancy of the information.
The broadest definition of a public figure identifies everyone as having the
potential to become a public figure at any point in one’s life.44 Public figures include not only people with a high probability of becoming public
figures, such as political candidates or party members, but potentially each
and every one of us.45 However, our discussion will focus only on currently
existing public figures. We do so to differentiate among the norms which
apply to true public figures versus those that apply to every person, as we
think privacy should be adjusted to account for the special features of public
figures and cannot be implemented on everyone in advance. We do claim
that the status of an existing public figure compared to the status of an
anonymous person that may or may not become a public figure one day is
totally different from the privacy perspective. The protection of privacy, on
the one hand, and the waiver of privacy for the purpose of public interest,

43

44

45

Cason v. Baskin, 30 So. 2d 635, 638 (Fla. 1947) (en banc) (“It is true that a person who, by his
accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the
public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, may be said to have become a public personage, and to that extent he thereby relinquishes at least a part of his right of
privacy.”). In Cason, the court found that Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings Baskin, author of The Yearling, “reasonably believed that the public would be interested in her autobiography,” which covered the period of her life in rural Florida. Id. at 637.
See Aaron Larson, Defamation: Libel and Slander, EXPERTLAW.COM (Nov. 9 2014),
http://www.expertlaw.com/library/personal_injury/defamation.html#3 (“A person can become
an ‘involuntary public figure’ as the result of publicity, even though that person did not want or
invite the public attention . . . . A person can also become a ‘limited public figure’ by engaging in
actions which generate publicity within a narrow area of interest.”).
Ordinary people may become “involuntary public figures” when they take part in an event or
occurrence of public significance, such as a crime, an accident, or a spontaneous act of heroism.
See 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood § 141 (2005) (“An individual may achieve such
pervasive fame or notoriety that he or she becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts, provided that he or she has a pervasive involvement in the affairs of society.”).
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on the other hand, function differently for public figures and non-public
figures, who might (or might not) become public figures in the future. Having said that, we welcome future discussions about anonymous people turning into public figures as a special category requiring different norms with
respect to the matter of privacy in various cases.
As the next step toward understanding privacy within the context of the
public interest or “right to know” private information about public figures,
we need to define the term “private information.”
B. What Information Should Stay Private for Public Figures?
The definitions of private information with respect to the discourse about
the public figures’ right to privacy range from broad to narrow. At the
broad end of the spectrum, “[i]nformation should be regarded as being ‘personal information’ if it is information about a natural person from which, or
by use of which, the person can be identified,”46 while the narrow end of the
spectrum includes more specific data about a person that is not usually exposed to the public, such as credit history47 or sexual information.48
All relevant definitions we use in this paper should comply with Parker’s
threshold of the three criteria: true, simple, and useful.49 They should also
comport with the five tests Parker enumerated: “(1) whether a person has
lost or gained privacy, (2) whether he should lose or gain privacy, (3) whether
he knows that he has lost or gained privacy, (4) whether he approves or disapproves of the loss or gain, and (5) how he experiences that loss or gain.”50
While concerns about information privacy abound, this paper’s narrow
focus is on the public interest in accessing private information about public
figures. Accordingly, we refer to information that can be grouped into the
following primary categories: medical information, criminal information,
sexual information, financial information, identifying information (home
address, family status, social activities), and misbehavior. The dissemination of any of these types of details about a public figure may violate his or
her balloon of privacy, in favor of the public’s right to gain access to this information, which we define as private.

46
47

48

49
50

2 COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA LAW REFORM COMMISSION, PRIVACY, § 1198 (1983).
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4) (2012) (“There is a need to insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect
for the consumer’s right to privacy.”).
See 38 States + DC Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE,
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ (last visited May 2, 2017) (listing 38 states
that have revenge porn statutes).
See Richard B. Parker, A Definition Of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 275, 277 (1974) (prescribing characteristics that to which definitions of privacy should aspire).
Id. at 278.
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This definition is important to our model, which aims to formulate a
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate private information on public figures. Before addressing the model and applying it to cases, however,
we must explain the origins of privacy law in the U.S. that gave rise to present legal rules about public figures, which, in our opinion, is not applicable
as is in the current digital era.
III. THE LAW OF PRIVACY FOR PUBLIC FIGURES
A. The U.S. Attitude Toward Privacy—The Constitutional Roots
1. The U.S Constitutional Origin—First Amendment Freedom Of Expression
Privacy as a legal concept has been recognized by many scholars as
“elusive and ill defined.”51 According to Daniel Solove, the multitude of
definitions produced by scholars can be narrowed down to six basic conceptions of privacy, including: “(1) the right to be let alone; (2) limited access to the self; (3) secrecy; (4) control of personal information; (5) personhood; and (6) intimacy.”52 The definition of privacy for the purposes of this
Article focuses on the psychological aspects of the term and, more specifically, the perceived personal “balloon,” or sphere of a private zone, that
centers on themes such as autonomy, freedom, and creating relationships.53
Accordingly, this paper will conceptualize privacy in a unique way by relying on the conceptual balloon of privacy that surrounds each and every one
of us, including public figures.
We claim that privacy as a right was first recognized by the U.S. in a
case involving the publication of private details about public figures
weighed against the public interest in exposure of this information. The focus of this U.S. approach to privacy in general and with respect to public
figures’ publicity is based on the freedom of speech, the right to know and
51

52
53

See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 393 (1978) (“The concept of
‘privacy’ is elusive and ill defined. Much ink has been spilled in trying to clarify its meaning.”); see
also James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures Of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J.
1151, 1154-55 (2004) (explaining that privacy is embarrassingly difficult to define and that it differs strangely from one culture, seemingly undermining the importance of keeping privacy as a
goal to protect personhood).
Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1094 (2002).
See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, To Read or Not to Read: Privacy Within Social Networks, the Entitlement of
Employees to a Virtual “Private Zone,” and the Balloon Theory, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 53, 80–86 (2014) (introducing balloon theory for the first time); see also PAUL BERNAL, INTERNET PRIVACY RIGHTS:
RIGHTS TO PROTECT AUTONOMY 8–9 (2014) (claiming that individuals gain autonomy to the
extent that they hold rights to control personal data and explaining that the internet poses challenges to individual control over such data) privacy in many ways but it can be controlled if we
will be aware of the importance of); infra Part IV.A.
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have access to information, the importance of the media and freedom of
the press, a perspective favoring the public and democratic values against
restricting discourse.54 This aspect was not emphasized in the famous 1890
Harvard Law Review article, The Right to Privacy by Louis Brandeis and
Samuel Warren.55 What inspired that article remains unknown, but it has
been suggested that Warren was particularly displeased by newspaper articles revealing details of his wedding to the daughter of a senator.56 Following the famous article’s publication, the U.S. legal system has recognized
privacy as an enforceable legal right.
The general legal origin of privacy rights in the U.S. is grounded in the
Fourth Amendment, which entitles people to the right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”57
The Fourteenth Amendment provided a different form of privacy when it
served as the justification for women’s rights to control their own bodies.58
The constitutional basis to privacy seems to conflict with another very
important U.S. constitutional right—the freedom of expression. The U.S.
cherishes the First Amendment, which protects freedom of expression, as
fundamental to American liberty.59 Freedom of expression permits free
54

55

56

57

58

59

See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press . . . .”); Shackelford, supra note 7, at 126 (positing that, as compared to Europe, the
deep U.S. commitment to free speech, different understandings of the public interest, and varying
legal cultures account for divergent understandings of privacy rights).
See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 219–20
(1890) (arguing that individual Americans have an enforceable privacy right and that “the protection of society must come mainly through a recognition of the rights of the individual”).
See Amy Gajda, What if Samuel D. Warren Hadn’t Married A Senator’s Daughter?: Uncovering The Press
Coverage That Led To The Right to Privacy 2–3 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res. Papers Series,
Research Paper No. 07-06, 2007) (explaining that coverage of Warren’s marriage to his wife
“may have . . . helped spark Warren and Brandeis’s The Right to Privacy”); see also William L.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960) (describing journalists’ interest in Warren’s
wife’s personal affairs); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 966–967 (1964) (explaining that the source of Warren’s frustration was “lurid newspaper gossip”).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable search and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); see also JEFFREY ROSEN, THE
UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 5 (2000) (proposing that
Warren and Brandeis believed citizens’ privacy right to not have their sex lives reported on by
gossip columnists was an extension of the broader right to be let alone). United States v. Johns,
469 U.S. 478, 487–88 (1985) (holding that a law enforcement search of packages can be permissible so long as the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights are not adversely affected).
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (articulating that “personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education” involve “the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment”).
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
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publication and (almost) free access to knowledge.60 The First Amendment
was the basis for many Supreme Court decisions enabling almost all publications about public figures.61 At first glance, freedom of expression nearly
overrides privacy rights and significantly minimizes the privacy regime.62
In his book Intellectual Privacy, Neil Richards discusses the relationship between privacy and freedom of speech.63 When these two are in conflict,
freedom of speech will win because of the importance of free speech to
open societies.64 However, Richards suggests that speech and privacy are
actually rarely in conflict. For example, while celebrity gossip might be a
price to pay for free speech, the privacy of ordinary citizens can be upheld.65
2. Diverse Attitudes and Different Sources of Privacy
A different attitude with respect to privacy rights is reflected by European Law. Evidently, Continental Europeans and Americans perceive privacy
quite differently. In fact, there is a significant conflict between the European
personal dignity approach to privacy, which emphasizes a right to one’s image, name, and reputation and a right to control one’s public image and
shield against unwanted public exposure, versus the liberal U.S. approach,
emphasizing personal liberty (as it pertains to state control), and focusing on
freedom of speech and freedom of expression.66 The “prime enemy” of the

60

61

62

63

64
65
66

right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
See Anupam Chander & Uyên P. eê, Free Speech, 100 IOWA L. REV. 501, 508–24 (2015) (explaining how the constitionally protected right to free speech has enabled the Internet to be a prominent source for free publication without censorship).
See, e.g., Amy Kristin Sanders, Fast Forward Fifty Years: Protecting Uninhibited, Robust and Wide-Open
Debate After New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 48 GA. L. REV. 843, 847–48 (2014) (profiling a
number of cases where application of the First Amendment altered the standard for determining
the privacy rights of public figures).
See AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI THREATEN
A FREE PRESS 29–32 (2015) (highlighting the broad latitude given to news organizations to publish information).
NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL
AGE 95–108 (2015) (discussing the relationship between privacy and freedom of speech and arguing that the concept of “intellectual privacy” can make privacy and speech compatible).
See id. at 103 (“All Western societies share a foundational commitment to the freedom of speech
on public matters—a belief that new ideas should be aired and given their say.”)
See id. at 107–08 (arguing that restrictions on surveillance of private rights further free speech
rights because they allow individuals to form new ideas without fear of publicity).
See Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2092 (2001) (explaining the distinction between personal dignity and personal autonomy); Whitman, supra note 51, at 1155–56,
1160–61 (describing different habits that reflect the different attitudes toward privacy, such as the
U.S. habit to share information about private matters with strangers and even ask questions
about salaries, in a way which is “‘difficult to imagine’ for northern Europeans or Asians,” and
explaining that Continental law is avidly protective of privacy in many realms of life). For a

990

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:4

Continental conception is the media, whereas the media is the liberal Americans’ most important tool for ensuring free expression.67 “To people accustomed to the [Continental attitude toward privacy], American law seems to
tolerate relentless and brutal violations of privacy in” many aspects of life.68
Europe, in addition to many countries around the world, recognizes privacy
as a firmly rooted fundamental right.69 The different attitudes are reflected
also with respect to posting information and pictures about public figures.
For example, the circulation of nude photos of celebrities on the Internet has
produced a conflict, with European courts alone acting to penalize Internet
service providers.70 Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights is one of the strongest milestones in protecting individuals’ private information in Europe.71 The differences between the European and American approaches to the right to be forgotten mirror of the differnces between
the European and U.S. approach to privacy.72 To summarize this point, as
Yale professor James Q. Whitman stated, “American privacy law seems,
from the European point of view, simply to have ‘failed.’”73
The right to privacy also appears in many international documents.74
For example, Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
states: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”75 Additionally, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights states:

67
68

69

70
71
72
73
74

75

comparative view of approaches to workplace privacy, see Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 53, at 9699.
Whitman, supra note 51, at 1161.
Id. at 1156 (“Europeans grow visibly angry, for example, about routine American practices like
credit reporting.”). Grounding his argument in historical fact, Whitman explains that the dignity
approach is the result of a revolt against the privilege of high status persons, who could protect
their personal honor in Continental courts of the aristocratic and monarchial societies of old Europe. Id. at 1165–66.
See 2000 O.J. (C 326) 10, art. 7 (“Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.”). Article 8 of the EU Charter extends Article 7’s right to privacy to the protection of personal data, which sets the EU Charter apart from other major human rights documents. Id. at art. 8 (1) (“Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data
concerning him or her.”).
See Whitman, supra note 51, at 1196–201 (describing European protection of individuals who appear nude in public).
The Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Article 8, (entered
into force Sep. 3, 1953)(outlining the right to respect for private and family life for all Europeans).
See supra Part III.A.1.
Whitman, supra note 51, at 1157.
See, e.g., LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA PRIVACY LAW: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 99-107
(2014) (discussing international tools in Europe and comparing national data privacy laws around
the world).
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12 (Dec. 10, 1948).
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(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.76

And finally, Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 1966, states: “1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”77
As seen above, the right to privacy has different meanings, different
sources and different definitions.78 Starting more than 100 years ago with
Warren and Brandeis’s “right to be left alone,”79 the diverse features of privacy have been highlighted by the continued dialogue as to its meaning by
courts and scholars alike.

76

77
78

79

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. For a
discussion on the meaning of private life under the treaty, see IVANA ROAGNA, COUNCIL OF
EUROPE HUMAN RIGHTS HANDBOOKS: PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE
AND FAMILY LIFE UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 12 (2012),
http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/Roagna2012_EN.pdf (“The Strasbourg Court has never
offered a clear and precise definition of what is meant by private life: in its view it is a broad concept, incapable of exhaustive definition . . . . [T]he notion of private life is much wider than that
of privacy, encompassing a sphere within which every individual can freely develop and fulfil his
personality, both in relation to others and with the outside world. Instead of providing a clearcut definition of private life, the Court has identified, on a case-by-case basis, the situations falling
within this dimension. The result is a rather vague concept, which the Court tends to construe
and interpret broadly . . . .”).
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf.
See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person . . . .”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 483 (1965) (“[T]he First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.”); Park Univ. Enters. v. Am. Cas. Co., 442 F.3d 1239, 1250 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“[I]n layman’s terms, ‘[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of privacy includes the right to be left
alone.’” (quoting Park Univ. Enters. V. Am. Cas. Co., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1110 (D. Kan.
2004)); Patricia Sanchez Abril, Selling Privacy, in THE INFORMATION ERA AND ADVANCED
TECHNOLOGY: NEW CHALLENGES IN PRIVACY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Shlomit
Yanisky-Ravid ed., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 6), http://www.alsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/NP-2014-Selling-Privacy-Abril.pdf (“In general, privacy law can be
defined as the government’s ability to restrict the penetration into one’s private space and the use,
transfer, or disclosure of certain personal information.”).
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 55, at 193.
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Theoretical justifications of privacy can be divided into a few schools of
thought: Law and Economics, Distributive Justice, Feminist Theory, and
Personality and Psychological Reasoning.80
Whereas Professor Posner wrote about economic value, the importance
of privacy rights, and avoiding misuse in order to maintain trust, other
scholars have focused on psychological aspects of privacy.81 The Balloon
Theory, which we rely on, describes privacy as a psychological bundle of
feelings and beliefs.82 This psychological state creates a zone surrounding
the person where one keeps and protects his thoughts, emotions, and acts
from interference by others in the public domain. Among other risks and
harms caused by an invasion of someone’s privacy is the detriment to personality traits like autonomy, freedom, dignity, and mental health. People
whose privacy has been invaded and who have had personal information
used against them have often experienced mental injury and helplessness.83
American scholars have argued that the idea behind privacy is the control
of one’s public image, name, and reputation over public disclosure of information about oneself.84 The media plays an important role. Whereas the Europeans consider the media the greatest enemy of privacy in the sense of keeping one’s dignity and controlling one’s public image – the media in the U.S.
liberty regime is one of the most significant democratic tools for exposing information and for control and criticism of governmental acts and actors.

80

81
82

83

84

See generally Sanchez-Abril, supra note 78; Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J.
421 (1980); see also Judith DeCew, Privacy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2015),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/privacy (presenting several scholars’ arguments on the theory of privacy in the law).
See DeCew, supra note 80.
See Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 53, at 83–86 (establishing a “balloon theory” of personal privacy as
a private sphere—analogous to an “intangible ‘baloon’”—which bundles one’s psychological
perceptions and emotions, and constantly and permanently surround one’s persona wherever one
goes—including within the public domain and digital media).
See, e.g., Post, supra note 66, at 2087 (discussing the “sense of violation” Monica Lewinsky must
have felt when her private sexual life was “forcibly made public”); see also James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2003) (describing the sense
of helplessness that results when strangers collect and have the ability to use private information
against an individual (citing Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1419–23 (2001) (invoking the story of Joseph K. in,
FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Willa & Edwin Muir trans., 1937), as a metaphor to conceptualize
problems with collecting mass data about individuals))).
See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 51 (1995) (describing the origins of individual tort claims for the invansion of the
right of privacy and that the modern tort has “evolved into . . . branches,” including “unreasonable publicity given to another’s private life, appropriation of another’s name or likeness, and publicity that unreasonably places another in a false light before the public”); see also THOMAS
NAGEL, CONCEALMENT AND EXPOSURE: AND OTHER ESSAYS 4 (2002) (arguing that having
control over the boundry between what people share and what they conceal is one of the most
important attributes of humanity).
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This notion is amplified significantly in the development and expansion
of the Internet in our digital age and has become most relevant to online
publications about public figures.85
B. The Loss Of Privacy for Public Figures in the U.S.
1. Public Figures Have (Almost) No Privacy Rights in the U.S.: The History Of
Supreme Court Decisions Establishing the Superiority Rule of Freedom of
Expression
In a jurisdiction based on free speech, free media, the right of the public
to know and democratic legal norms protecting the citizenry from governmental interference, we should not be surprised that the legal system sanctifies the old and the new media. Unfortunately, when discussing privacy
(within the privacy discourse) the media (and the public interest to know)
have become the great enemy of the value of privacy. The more advanced
the technology, the less privacy may flourish.86 To understand the legal current situation in the digital era for the purpose of suggesting a new model, we
first have to understand the legal ruling regarding public figures in general.
The first milestone in the discourse on public figures within the U.S.
was the Supreme Court case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.87 The history of
public figures and the law is rooted in the analysis of this landmark decision
of 1964.88 The ruling provided guidelines and set forth the legal norm addressing the conflict between the right to know, freedom of speech, and the
right of publicity on the one hand and the rights to privacy and to recover
compensation against defamation on the other hand.89
Sullivan was one of three elected Commissioners in charge of the police
of the City of Montgomery Alabama. He brought a civil libel action against
the New York Times. The circuit court of Montgomery awarded him
damages of $500,000, the full amount claimed, and the Supreme Court of
85
86
87
88

89

As Whitman argues, this amplification has been spurred on by the free market. Whitman, supra
note 51, at 1171.
See Shackelford, supra note 7, at 127 (claiming that technological advances are “causing societies . . . to rethink the bounds of privacy rights”).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
L. B. Sullivan, one of three elected Commissioners in Montgomery Alabama, and who was in
charge of the police department, claimed that an advertisement in the New York Times titled
“Heed Their Rising Voices,” which called attention to civil rights violations in the South, referred to him by the word “police.” Id. at 256–58. The publication did not mention Sullivan’s
name but included descriptions of brutal violence against a peacefully protesting Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., including the bombing of his home, which almost killed his wife and child, as well
as claims that Dr. King was arrested seven times and was charged with a felony which carried a
ten-year prison sentence. Id. at 257–58.
See Duhart, supra note 25, at 367 (stating that N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan “set the framework of media law unique to public officials and, subsequently, public figures”).
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Alabama affirmed. The New York Times appealed.90 The case was about
a paid advertisement, entitled “Heed Their Rising Voices.”91 Names were
not mentioned but the word “police” identified Sullivan as the head of the
police department. Sullivan, however, made no efforts to prove that he suffered actual damages or loss as a result of the alleged libel.92
Although the Court admitted that some of the statements were inaccurate,93 it reversed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that the First
Amendment provides safeguards for freedom of speech and the press.94
The Court held that the need to criticize public officials should be protected
and that journalists should not give pause for fear of defamation lawsuits.
Free speech as a national interest hence prevailed, placing a limitation on
defamation cases brought by officials.95 According to the Supreme Court,
“debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and . . . it may well include . . . unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials.”96 Therefore, public officials could not recover damages “for a defamatory falsehood relating to [their] official conduct [without
proof] that the statement was made with ‘actual malice,’” meaning that the
statement was made (1) “with knowledge that it was false,” or (2) “with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”97 This means that simple
negligence is not enough for public officials to recover from defamation by
the press. Therefore, with such a high burden “the Court made it extremely difficult if not impossible for such officials to prevail in libel actions
against media defendants.”98 The result is that critics of public officials are
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91

92
93

94
95
96
97
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Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256–58.
Id. at 257–58 (quoting the advertisement, which stated: “Again and again the Southern violators
have answered Dr. King’s peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed
his home almost killing his wife and child. They have assaulted his person. They have arrested
him seven times—for ‘speeding,’ ‘loitering’ and similar ‘offenses.’ And now they have charged
him with ‘perjury’—a felony under which they could imprison him for ten years. . . .”). The advertisement cost about $4,800 to publish. Id. at 260.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 258–59 (“It is uncontroverted that some of the statements contained in the two paragraphs
were not accurate descriptions of events which occurred in Montgomery . . . . Dr. King had not
been arrested seven times, but only four.”); see also Duhart, supra note 25, at 368 (explaining that
although the Court knew inaccurate statements had been made, it based its decision on more important policy considerations).
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 264.
Usman, supra note 12, at 951–52 (describing the balancing process the Supreme Court used to
construct the constitutional framework for adjudicating defamation actions).
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
Id. at 279–80 (Which states, “The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with “actual malice”—that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”).
Elsa Ransom, The Ex-Public Figure: A Libel Plaintiff Without a Class, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 389,
392 (1995); see also Usman, supra note 12, at 961, n.76 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271–72 (quot-
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not threatened by defamation cases, even when the publication contains
lies.99 Journalists were given extra leeway with respect to coverage of public
officials, the main takeaway of this decision about defamation cases being
that simple negligence in journalism—even that which resulted in false
statements—does not give rise to liability in a defamation suit brought by
public officials.100
There are some justifications behind this generosity towards journalists,
among them: principles of free speech and press; the public’s right to know
and the need to criticize the government; fear of a chilling effect or selfcensorship by the media;101 and promotion of racial equality. However,
voices against the decision expressed concerns about the promotion of
journalistic abuse and misconduct; the exposure of public officials to
blackmail; and the risk of exposure creating a deterrent to people considering public service.102
To those critics, we would add that the New York Times decision harms the
right of privacy for public figures by nullifying their legitimate balloons entirely.
After Sullivan, public figures simply lost their privacy in the U.S. Many
cases have shown how very far courts are willing to go without finding
“reckless disregard.” Just four years after New York Times, the Supreme
Court found that failure to investigate or seek any corroboration before
publishing an allegation does not rise to the level of reckless disregard for
the truth.103 The first cases to follow New York Times were all about public
officials. However, it did not take long for courts broaden the norm to include also public figures in the broader sense. Among many others are Cur-
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ing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963))) (showing that the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
Court’s ruling utilized language from the opinion in NAACP v. Button).
See Usman, supra note 12, at 961 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280).
See Duhart, supra note 25, at 368 (explaining that this resulted from the Supreme Court giving
priority to the existence of a robust free press).
See Kermit L. Hall, Justice Brennan and Cultural History: New York Times v. Sullivan and Its Times,
27 CAL. W. L. REV. 339, 351 n.67 (1991) (stating that lawsuits against the New York Times “represented a threat to the paper’s balance sheet and, even more important, a chilling of its coverage
of the civil rights movement,” and noting that plaintiffs sought, in total, $5,600,000 in damages).
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong? 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782,
817 (1986) (“On balance, the common law rules of defamation (sensibly controlled on the question of damages) represent a better reconciliation of the dual claims of freedom of speech and the
protection of individual reputation than does the New York Times rule that has replaced it.”); see also Duhart, supra note 25, at 369–70 (stating that some critics of the New York Times decision
claimed it “invites journalistic misconduct” and “will drive capable persons away from government service”).
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732–33 (1968); see also Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,
Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991) (holding that the First Amendment protects deliberate alteration of
quotes so long as “the alteration [does not] result[ ] in a material change in the meaning conveyed by the statement”); Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 658
(1989) (reiterating that “a public figure plaintiff must prove more than an extreme departure from
professional standards . . . [in order to] provide a sufficient basis for finding actual malice”).
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tis Publishing Co. v. Butts.104 This time the Court discussed a figure who did
not necessarily meet the criterion of a public officials (unlike Sullivan). Firstly, the plaintiff was a famous football coach, James Wallace Butts Jr. (Wally
Butts). Secondly, he was a Georgia University athletic director and as such
was paid from private funds; therefore, he was a private employee and not
a state one.105 Butts filed a libel suit against Curtis Publishing after an article published in The Saturday Evening Post falsely accused him of “fixing” a
football game.106 The ultimate outcome of this case, and others to follow,
was that First Amendment law as to public officials was extended to public
figures who play no role in government.107
U.S. courts explicitly went on, expanding the N.Y. Times v. Sullivan case
to public figures. In Associated Press v. Walker, a libel claim was brought by a
man accused of inciting a riot against federal marshals.108 The plaintiff,
who was a national military figure with his own following (the “Friends of
Walker),” was still not deemed a public official at the time the false news
dispatch was released about him. According to the dispatch, Walker led
opposition to federal efforts to enforce court ordered desegregation at the
University of Mississippi.109 Walker sued the publisher for libel, claiming
the publication was false.110
In deciding Butts and Walker, the Supreme Court expanded the already
broad definition of public official stated in New York Times v. Sullivan to an
even broader one, expanding press protection to its coverage of any public
figure. The borders between governmental and private sector thus gradually blurred.111
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107
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110
111

Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 161 (1967) (Harlan, J., plurality opinion, announcing
the judgments of the Court), aff’g 351 F.2d 702, aff’g Butts v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 242 F. Supp 390
(N.D. Ga. 1964).
Id. at 135–36; Usman, supra note 12, at 962.
Butts, 388 U.S. at 135–37. Butts sued for 10 million dollars, but the initial jury award was for
$3,060,000. Id. at 137–38.
Duhart, supra note 25, at 372–73.
See Butts, 388 U.S. at 140. The Supreme Court combined the Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker cases and issued a single opinion. Id. at 130 n.*.
Id. at 140 (“[A] massive riot erupted because of federal efforts to enforce a court decree ordering
the enrollment of a Negro, James Meredith, as a student in the University. The dispatch stated
that respondent Walker, who was present on the campus, had taken command of the violent
crowd and had personally led a charge against federal marshals sent there to effectuate the
court’s decree and to assist in preserving order. It also described Walker as encouraging rioters to
use violence and giving them technical advice on combating the effects of tear gas.”); Duhart, supra note 25, at 371–372.
Butts, 388 U.S. at 140.
See Butts, 388 U.S. at 140, 155; Duhart, supra note 25, at 372 n.42 (“Today, public figures and
public officials are nearly impossible to distinguish. With presidential candidates routinely appearing on late-night entertainment shows, it seems there is almost no difference at all between
officials and celebrities.”).
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The distinction made between a public figure and private figures is critical to the outcome of a case sounding in libel.112
The many decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding public figures
have established a rule in which the right of privacy has become a subordinate right to competing rights, such as freedom of expression, freedom of
speech, and the right to know. However, as will be discussed below, our
approach is different and calls for undermining the total superiority of these
rights against the privacy right even within the discourse on public figures.
2. Rethinking Supreme Court Privacy Subordinate Standpoint
This article offers a new angle on privacy in trying to find the private
figure (with its balloon of privacy) within the public figure, claiming the distinction is not a “black and white” decision.
Our approach to the issue of reasonable publication about public figures differs from the U.S. norm for several reasons. First, the Supreme
Court rules on public figures were shaped according to defamation law and
the expansive freedoms given by the First Amendment; we would analyze
those cases from the perspective that prizes the value of privacy. The justifications to the U.S. rulings do not, most of the time, address privacy rights.
Second, because the rulings are based on the First Amendment, emphasizing
freedom of expression and freedom of the press, we would impose strict liability and demand accuracy by the press, although it might lead to selfcensorship, which is counter to the purposes of the First Amendment.113
Third, where the rulings put the public and the press as the protagonists, our
model looks at the issue of privacy with the individual at the center. Therefore, the price of false or inaccurate publication is too high to pay. Fourth,
where privacy is based on a liberal conception, our approach is more toward personality theories that enable a balloon of privacy in public domains. Fifth, and most importantly, the Supreme Court did not imagine
much less consider the Internet when shaping its tests, finding that “the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare.”114 We
think the digital era has changed the concept of privacy and the rules of the
game, hurtling society towards a total loss of privacy.115 The right to be
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Duhart, supra note 25, at 372.
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (“The First Amendment requires that
we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.”).
Id. at 345.
See Shackelford, supra note 7, at 126 (claiming that our traditional understandings of privacy are
changing as a result of “an increase in privacy violations, facilitated by new advanced surveillance
technologies”). But see Iryna Ievdokymova, ACTA and the Enforcement of Copyright in Cyberspace: The
Impact on Privacy, 19 EUR. L.J. 759, 762 (2013) (describing Article 27(3) of the European Unions’
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which “provides that cooperative efforts are to
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forgotten, given the difficulty of erasing digital publication, compared to
old-fashioned kinds that disappeared when old journals and newspapers
were gone – make us rethink the rulings.
An interesting illustration of our arguments about different approaches
to privacy (than the U.S. norms), can be partially found in the European
approach which we will discuss briefly below.
The different attitude of the European approach to privacy has inspired
us to think differently, even though this approach was not adopted in our
proposed model.116 In Continental jurisdictions, such as Germany and
France, the philosophy of personality theory prevails and values like dignity
and honor inform legal tools in which individuals, including public figures,
have the right to control their image and exposure to the public, either by
traditional publications or by cyberspace tools. Therefore, even if a public
figure appeared nude in public, she has the legal right to restrict publication
of this appearance. This is true even in cases where a public figure sold her
nude picture. The control over the public image invalidates publication after the sale of the image. The fact that a public figure agreed to be photographed in an intimate pose is insufficient to validate the publication of this
image.117 In the digital age, Continental courts impose restrictions against
Internet publication of public figures in any way that can harm their image
(e.g., nude photographs) and they impose liability on Internet providers.118
Even when, technically, the photographs spread and could be found on
many Internet sites the European courts still felt obliged to forbid the circulation of the pictures in order to express the importance of private life in
cases of those who, according to our definitions, are public figures.119 Public figures who appear nude still have the right to control their public image
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117

118
119

‘preserve fundamental principles such as . . . privacy’” (quoting Margot E. Kaminski, An Overview
and the Evolution of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI & TECH 385, 412 (2011)).
See Megan Richardson & Lesley Hitchens, Celebrity Privacy and Benefits of Simple History, in NEW
DIMENSIONS IN PRIVACY LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 250–51
(Andrew T. Kenyon & Megan Richardson eds., 2006) (providing examples of the European approach to the privacy of celebrities). For descriptions and examples of the European system,
mainly Germany and France about public figures, as well as for court decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), see Shackelford, supra note 7, at 171–98, 207.
Whitman, supra note 51, at 1198–1201 (2004) (discussing examples of famous figures, which we
would consider public figures, such as French actress Florence Bouvard, whom a French court
“permitted to suppress movie scenes in which she had willingly appeared naked,” because
“[o]ne’s nude image is simply not definitively alienable under continental norms;” and stating
that German and French courts “feel obliged to penalize the persons responsible, be they Internet service providers or delinquent ex-boyfriends”).
Id. at 1998–99.
See Whitman, supra note 51, at 1198–99 (describing a case in which a German court “imposed
liability on [an] Internet service provider[ ] that housed nude images of celebrities” when Steffi
Graf, a famous former tennis star, “successfully sued Microsoft for its refusal to . . . prevent dissemination of a ‘fake’ . . . picture of her head superimposed on the nude body of another woman,” showing that sometimes relief can be granted when public figures are involved).

May 2017]

PUBLIC INTEREST VS. PRIVATE LIVES

999

and determine when and under what circumstances they may be seen, in
the nude or otherwise.
Looking at the different approaches of the U.S. and Continental European countries, it seems that American law regarding public figures is
caught in a gravitational orbit of liberty values, while European law is
caught in an orbit of personal dignity. As was claimed about the different
approaches to privacy on the two sides of the Atlantic, “There are certainly
times when the two bodies of law approach each other more or less nearly.
Yet they are consistently pulled in different directions . . . .”120
In our view, neither of the approaches can prevail in the other jurisdiction because of the different theoretical origins (personal dignity vs. freedom
of expression). The model we offer in this paper follows neither approach,
but rather tries to develop reasonable criteria within the arena of the public
right to know to decide in which cases it would be legitimate for public interest to prevail versus other cases in which the skimpy balloon of privacy
available to public figures may prevail. Accordingly, this paper discusses
the appropriate relationship between public interest and the right to privacy
regarding public figures. More specifically, we will address the question of
when public figures have the right to keep information away from the public. In the next Part, we will focus on our proposed new filtering model,
which is more applicable in the digital era, and which addresses this question differently and proposes a way to manage which information should be
published about public figures and which information, if any, should be
kept private, offering a contrast to the traditional U.S. legal norm that
grants superiority to the public interest/right to know, resulting in an extreme lack of privacy for public figures.
IV. A FILTERING MODEL:
THE PUBLIC INTEREST TO KNOW VS. PRIVACY PROTECTION
A. Public Figures and the Balloon of Privacy
Ideas for redefining the legal norms regarding public figures have been
offered by some scholars. Scott Shackelford, for example, proposed to narrow the category of public figure by limiting the legal concept of the public
figure in the U.S. to four categories: permanent public figures, celebrities,
temporary public figures, and private citizens. Following the German rule,
each category would receive a different degree of privacy and duration of
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Whitman, supra note 51, at 1162–63 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576–78 (2003))
(analyzing Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Lawrence v. Texas, as an example of the
sometimes mutually influential relationship between the liberty and dignity approaches).
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protection from the minimum to the maximum.121 Our model works differently, without following any specific jurisdiction, but it could be adopted
by all jurisdictions as general criteria in the digital era.
One of the most sensitive questions in the discourse of privacy rights of
public figures is in which cases should information about them not be published. We argue that public figures should also enjoy the “balloon” of privacy on the Internet to a certain level in any of the following situations: (1)
the information is private in the sense that it describes intimate personal details, which do not contribute to or are irrelevant to the fulfillment of his or
her public role;122 (2) the information serves mainly (if not solely) as voyeurism; and (3) the information is not of a kind that the public figure exposes to
the public by his or her own will (without regret).
We claim that every person should have a right to privacy. Even a public figure at the end of the day has the right to private premises.123 The Balloon Theory describes privacy as a sphere that can change in size and exists
even in public arenas to protect personal privacy.124 The metaphorical balloon symbolizes our psychological perception of private information and
feelings. The word “balloon” reflects the way we understand and feel the
need for privacy.125 According to the theory, the balloon of privacy also exists in cyberspace around public figures, subject to two exceptions. First, the
public figure’s balloon size is smaller compared to that of a “regular,”
anonymous person. Second, the mechanisms targeting the size of the balloon and activating the scope of protection are controlled by different rules.
We believe that the controlling rules should be flexible and correspond with
different situations. Thus, defining public figures according to a rigid list or
claiming that public figures have no right to privacy every time a publication about them is justified does not lead to a reasonable solution. In other
words, a public figure’s balloon of privacy can shrink and expand depending on the situation. Furthermore, it would be inappropriate to predetermine a permissible degree of severity regarding the harm caused by a
privacy violation, as the assessment of such harm is unique to a specific individual, and ought not be predetermined and uniform for each and every
person within the definition of “public figure,” especially in the digital era.
B. The Three Principle Filtering Model
Our proposed Three Principle Model consists of three elements: (1) the
relevancy of the private information to members of the public, and (2)
121
122
123
124
125

Shackelford, supra note 7, at 200–03.
For example if he or she was pictured naked in his or her private home.
David Kretzmer, Demonstrations and the Law, 19 ISR. L. REV. 47, 120 (1984).
See Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 53, at 83–86.
Id. at 82–84.
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whether access to the information is necessary for learning about our world,
and (3) proportionality.
1. The Relevancy of Private Information
Our stance is that exposing public figures’ private lives is justified to the
extent the information exposed is relevant to the public. Accordingly, this
article recognizes that the privacy rights of public figures will vary in scope
according to the relevance of the information about them and the benefit its
publication would have on the public as compared to the impact it will
have on the public figure himself or herself. The results will undoubtedly
differ from case to case; therefore, we avoid creating bright line rules but
instead recommend guidelines for addressing each unique case. Ultimately,
we argue that any information relevant to one’s functional duties as a public figure or information that might influence the public should be published, even if it reduces the public figure’s privacy. In other words, we argue that public figures waive their right to privacy as long as the
circumstances meet certain criteria.
According to our guidelines, the more influential the figure is to the
public, the smaller his/her privacy balloon is and the more we can publish
about this person. For example, prime ministers, according to the balloon
theory, have the smallest balloon around them and enjoy only a small
amount of privacy. In the case of a prime minster and according to the criteria suggested in this paper, we can justify almost all publications about
him or her on a wide range of public and private topics in a way that almost all information can be released to the public. A prime minister is
elected by the public to a role defined by law as having a wide range of influence on each and every citizen. Any information about a leader of a
country who possesses more power and authority than any other individual
would therefore have an important value to the public. As a result, the
right for the public to have access to this information overrules the prime
minister’s right to privacy. Even “private” information about a spouse, vacation habits, the way s/he treats his/her children, and personal health
conditions may be important according to the criteria we suggest, as they
might influence his actions and, hence, the public. Therefore, Internet
publications of this kind might be justified.
The wider and the deeper a political figure’s influence is, the wider and
deeper the range of private information that would be legitimate to publish
according to our model. However, we do claim that a limited amount of
private information can and should be kept within the privacy premises. In
other words, there is a limited scope of behavior with a high level of intimacy within private places, such as the private homes or even private bathrooms, which should remain private. These premises have no connection
to the public or influence on the public and should be kept private even
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when it belongs to a public figure. For example, the intimate relationship
of the prime minister with his family or naked pictures of the prime minister
would be covered within his right to privacy. In many other cases, behavior that can reveal to the public his or her suitability for office, such as past
experience, drinking habits or stress habits, should be published. If any
doubt about whether to publish certain information exists, it is better to err
in favor of the public’s right to knowledge.126 We recognize that the harm
of avoiding publication and maintaining a large balloon might outweigh the
benefits of protecting privacy in certain cases.
A journalist, for example, will have more privacy (a larger privacy balloon) than a prime minister. It would still be important to the public to
know private information about the journalist that relates to the fields he or
she is covering, as a means of judging her reliability. For example, news
anchor Brian Williams recently lost his job after it became public that he
had embellished a story from his coverage of the Iraq war in 2003. Had
the lie been related to his private life and not his work, which influences the
millions of viewers who watched the NBC Nightly News, that information
probably would have been subject to his right to privacy.
This rule is also applicable in regard to anonymous - innocent people
who have become involuntarily public figures.
An anonymous, innocent person can become a public figure and lose
some of his right to privacy. For example, someone who takes part in a
demonstration that ends up being covered by the news can have information about him and his private life rightfully published when it is relevant to the purpose of the demonstration.127
The relevancy of the private information is a dominant criterion of controlling the publication of private data in the digital era, but it is not the sole
factor. The next Sub-Part will address an additional criterion controlling
the size of the privacy balloon of public figures: access to necessary information.
2. Access to Necessary Information for Learning Important Knowledge about Our
World and Being Part of Society
Information is a survival tool. Access to knowledge and learning about
the world is another justification for publishing information instead of using
the right to privacy as an excuse to avoid publication. In almost every
126
127

See RICHARDS, supra note 63 (arguing that privacy is valuable in large part because it facilitates
development and expression of knowledge to the public).
See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644–45 (2000) (describing James Dale, an assistant scoutmaster who was expelled from the Boy Scouts of America after a newspaper published
an interview identifying him as the copresident of the Lesbian/Gay Alliance at Rutgers University).
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moment, people make judgments about their next action or decision based
on the existing information that is available to them. The more a person
knows about the world, the better his or her decisions will be. Information
on websites can be critical to someone’s integration into society and even to
one’s survival.128 This principle is distinguished from the first one (relevancy), although they may partially overlap. Whereas the relevancy principle
focuses on the role of the public figure, this principle focuses on the public
access to knowledge—including access to information that may lead to better health and education decisions, increased safety and efficiency, and
overall improvement of individuals’ lives. The information itself, rather
than the figure, is placed in the center. The attention public figures usually
attract may justify this kind of publication. The Internet plays an important
role when implementing this principle.
Consequently, this factor, which can help us differentiate between information that falls under public interest and should be published rather
than hidden behind the right to privacy, concerns access to necessary
knowledge about the world. If the information teaches us important
knowledge about “handling” life, it should be exposed to the public. How
we determine whether certain private information provides us with tools to
handle life’s challenges should, therefore, be included under the public interest justification.129
People who become the center of news will not only be exposed to the
public as public figures, but publication of relevant private information
about them would be justified. When information is designated to public
records, publication is also justified.130 Therefore, identifying public figures
as the ones who are suffering from diseases, especially when those public
figures suffer from contagious diseases, might be justified as a tool to learn
about the disease. However, if the medical condition of a public figure,
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See generally Craig Calhoun, The Infrastructure Of Modernity: Indirect Social Relationships, Information
Technology, and Social Integration, in SOCIAL CHANGE AND MODERNITY 205 (Hans Haferkamp &
eds., 1992) (explaining how information technology facilitates indirect relationships, which are a
pivotal component of modern society); Jack Balkin, What is Access to Knowledge?, BALKINIZATION
(Apr. 21, 2006), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/04/what-is-access-to-knowledge.html (explaining the impact access to information has on social, political, and economic influence).
See, e.g., McNutt v. N.M. State Tribune Co., 538 P.2d 804, 806–08 (1975) (holding publication by
a newspaper of private names and addresses of police officers who took part in a shootout between “Black Berets” gang and the police, in which two of the gang members were killed, was
privileged, where the officers had refused to discuss the matter and their addresses were public
record).
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (holding that a state may not “impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from public records”);
McNutt, 538 P.2d at 808 (“The address of most persons appears in many public records . . . . We,
therefore, hold that and individual’s home address is a public fact and that its mere publication,
without more, cannot be viewed as an invasion of privacy.”).
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such as a singer or an actor, has no informative social function for society,
the public figure should enjoy a right to privacy.131
Another example is when a new medical treatment is introduced to the
public. The medical history of the people who are taking the treatment
might be considered private information. However, as this data is important to the public for everyone’s survival, it might justify publishing it
rather than keeping the data private. The identity of organ or sperm donors should be exposed for the same reasons. These people find themselves
to be public figures even if they were focused on other aspects of their activities. They have become public figures against their free will. However,
exposing information about their medical condition to the public might
play an important role to avoid future risks to persons within the public. In
order to draw some boundaries around this unlimited access to private information and to control the level of exposure - we need to add a new cumulative factor of proportionality, as we will explain in the next Sub-Part.
Prosser and Keeton wrote:
Such individuals become public figures for a season; and “until they have reverted to the lawful and unexciting life led by the great bulk of the community,
they are subject to the privileges which publishers have to satisfy the curiosity of
the public as their leaders, heroes, villains, and victims.’ The privilege extended
even to identification and some reasonable depiction of the individual’s family,
although there must certainly be some limits to their own private lives into
which the publisher could not go.132

Freedom of speech may justify the publication of many private details of
public figures, even when they unwillingly have become famous, such as
rape victims, adopted children, etc.133 Medical information of rare diseases
or infection transmitted by humans may justify publication of private details
due to public interest in these people who have become unwilling public
figures.134
131
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For example, actor Charlie Sheen revealed in 2015 that he contracted HIV four years prior and
had kept it a secret until then. Emily Steel, Charlie Sheen Says He Has H.I.V. and Has Paid Millions to
Keep It Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/18/business/charlie-sheen-hiv-positive.html?_r=0. Unlike back in the 1980s or 1990s, when news about a celebrity being HIV-positive carried a social impact by debunking myths and creating awareness of
the disease, the news about Charlie Sheen today carries no such value. The only reason he voluntarily sat for an interview was in order to put a stop to extortionists. Id.
Prosser & Keeton, supra note 20, at 861–62 (footnotes omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF TORTS §867, Comment f (AM. LAW INST., 1934).
See, e.g., Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 712 (N.C. 1988) (rejecting the claims of Susie Hall and her
adoptive mother “for tortious invasion of privacy by truthful public disclosure of ‘private’ facts”
against a newspaper that published an article about Susie’s carnival-traveling parents’ abandonment of her seventeen years prior); see also TRIBE, supra note 20, at 889–90 (explaining that the
balancing publication of private individuals’ information with individual privacy can be a judgment of degrees).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, Comment g (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (citing “a
rare disease” as a newsworthy exception to privacy based on a legitimate public concern).
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An example of an innocent, unwilling, and young public figure where
the information published about her is justified in terms of the second criterion of access to knowledge is the case of fourteen-year-old Elizabeth
Smart. On June 5, 2002, Elizabeth was abducted from her bedroom in
Salt Lake City, Utah. Elizabeth’s parents worked with local and national
media to increase visibility of the case; public interest in the kidnapping of
the attractive, accomplished blonde teenager was immense.135 The publication of these kind of cases, nowadays via the internet, although it involves
private and intimate information, might help rescue the victim, track and
punish the criminals, and prevent future crime. Therefore, exposing private details is justified under the second criterion of our proposed model:
access to knowledge.
However, according to our model, we claim that freedom of speech is
not an absolute unlimited right, even for public figures. Publishing private
data (medical or other) about people may prevent them from taking part in
certain activities or medical treatment because they fear that their private
details and identities will be exposed publically. For example, on the one
hand, taking an HIV test serves the public interest, which should be encouraged. On the other hand, publishing the details and results of the HIV
tests might prevent people from taking the test in the first place. The harm
from not taking the test and not detecting the illness might outweigh the
benefit of publishing the details.136
The Three Principle Model proposed in this work can serve as a guideline for filtering information about public figures and deciding when the information should be open to the public or when public figures deserve the
right to privacy. Activating the model in the digital era requires precautionary steps, which will be activated by the third cumulative principle of
the proposed model, as will be discussed below. The level of privacy of
public figures the model may achieve depends on the number of factors being used as a filter. The more factors that are activated in filtering private
information, the more privacy we achieve.

135

136

See ELIZABETH SMART & CHRIS STEWART, MY STORY (2013); Elizabeth Smart Fast Facts, CNN
(Nov. 2, 2016, 2:54 PM) http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/14/us/elizabeth-smart-fast-facts/; see
also SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS (Sept. 6, 2014, 4:49 PM),
https://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (detailing the ethical responsibilities of journalists, particularly regarding the balancing of reporting private information of individuals). In this particular case,
nine months after the abduction, Elizabeth’s younger sister, who had witnessed the kidnapping,
remembered that the abductor’s voice sounded like that of a vagrant who had done some work
for the family some months before the kidnapping. That detail ultimately led to Elizabeth’s rescue, which was a major media story nationwide.
See Paul Marcus & Tara L. McMahon, Limiting Disclosure of Rape Victims’ Identities, 64 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1019, 1030–31 (1991) (describing the trauma and stigma associated with being a victim of
rape, illustrating that unwilling victims of criminal offenses especially must have some volume in
their privacy balloons).

1006

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:4

3. The Proportionality Rule
When applying rules on publication of private information about public
figures, we can benefit from the rule of proportionality. According to the
proportionality test, the relevant question is whether one can satisfy a legitimate public interest with a less invasive action, which avoids harming the
rights of others involved.137 In other words, proportionate publication must
achieve the goals the private data serves without exposing all the details
about the figure. For example, it may be proportionate to publish facts
about medical diseases or a crime without pictures of the victims or other
irrelevant identifiable information. If the information published about the
public figure could have been obtained using less invasive means, exposing
those details to the public harms their privacy and, therefore, is not justified.
Freedom of speech justifies as newsworthy “all events and items of information which are out of the ordinary humdrum routine, and which have
‘that indefinable quality of information which arouses [sic] public attention.’”138 Freedom of speech and the right to privacy are generally seen as
conflicting with one another; however, scholars such as Neil Richards and
Mark Tunick have expressed that these two rights can peacefully coexist.139 Similarly, we assert that certain legal tools, such as the proportionality rule, can be used to adjust the current compromise between freedom
of speech and protection of privacy.
For the purpose of understanding the rule of proportionality in regard
to cases of publications of private information about public figures, consider
the following two examples.
a. Publishing Drunk Drivers’ Photos
Consider the following excerpt from Elizabeth K. Hansen, for the “Society of Professional Journalists” in its Ethics Case Studies series:
137

138
139

Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 53, at 95; see also Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 75 (2008) (“The core of necessity analysis is the deployment of a ‘least-restrictive means’ (LRM) test [in which the court] ensures that the measure does not curtail the right any more than is necessary for the government
to achieve its stated goals.”); AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 245–378 (Doron Kalir trans., 2012) (exploring four components of
proportionality, as a applied to legislatures when balancing legislative action against individual
rights: “proper purpose,” “rational connection,” “necessity,” and proportionality stricto sensu [or,
‘balancing’]”); id. at 317 (discussing the proportionality principle in the context of general
consitutional law from a legislative perspective).
KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, at 860 (quoting Sweenek v. Pathe News, 16 F. Supp. 746, 747
(E.D.N.Y. 1936)).
See RICHARDS, supra note 63, at 95 (“Instead of being conflicting values, privacy and speech can
instead be mutually supportive.”); MARK TUNICK, BALANCING PRIVACY AND FREE SPEECH:
UNWANTED ATTENTION IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 14 (2015) (contending that the values of
free speech and privacy can exist hand in hand).
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When readers of The Anderson News picked up the . . . issue of the newspaper, stripped across the top of the front page was a New Year’s greeting and a
warning. “HAVE A HAPPY NEW YEAR,” the banner read. “But please
don’t drink and drive and risk having your picture published.” Readers were
referred to the editorial page where [it was] explained that . . . the newspaper
would publish photographs of all persons convicted of drunken driving in Anderson County.
....
. . . [The newspaper] limited the photos to residents of Anderson County or
surrounding counties where the News circulates. [It] also began publishing the
photos weekly rather than monthly.
After a person charged with DUI was convicted or pleaded guilty, the
county jailer (who is elected in Kentucky) supplied the information and the
photo taken at the time of the arrest to the newspaper. Under each photo the
newspaper printed the person’s name, age, place of residence, date and time arrested, charge, blood alcohol level and date convicted. The paper published
the photos regardless of the age of the offender and made no distinction between first offenders and those who had been arrested before for DUI.

....
Police told the newspaper representative one teenager tried to commit suicide
after his DUI arrest because he feared his picture would be published. Some
whose pictures appeared said the publication hurt their families, particularly their
children . . . . The policy applied only to drunken driving convictions and not to
any other misdemeanor or felony offenses [such as rape or robbery].140

According to the model, the information about driving under the influence meets two criteria: it is important and a value of access to knowledge
about facts of life (teenagers, politicians, and actually everyone who drinks
and drives). However, using the proportionality rule would have enabled
posting, nowadays via the internet, the blurred photographs of images with
important details such as age or status without any identifiable details. This
rule enables solutions, which are not all or none (posting or avoiding), as the
case reflects. “This issue is not black and white; it is a wide range of
grays.”141
b. Naming Victims of Sex Crimes
These cases also meet both criteria of relevant and legitimate information
and access to knowledge in the digital era. However, again, using the rule of
proportionality, in these cases, the best course of action might be to tell about
140

141

Elizabeth K. Hansen, Publishing Drunk Drivers’ Photos, SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS,
http://www.spj.org/ecs10.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2017); see also SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC’Y PROF.
JOURNALISTS (Sept. 6, 2014, 4:49 PM), https://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (explaining that
journalists have an ethical obligation to use “heightened sensitivity” when publishing materials
regarding juveniles and to “show compassion” for those affected by news coverage)
Amber Orand & Sara Stone, Naming Victims of Sex Crimes, SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS,
http://www.spj.org/ecs11.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2017).
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the case “but refrain from publishing graphic details about the abuse the
child endured. Perhaps in other cases, there is no pressing public interest for
the child’s identity to be released, and his or her privacy is the utmost consideration.”142
Applying the proposed Three Principle Filtering Model to court cases
will be addressed in the next Part.
V. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE—APPLYING THE PROPOSED THREE
PRINCIPLE FILTERING MODEL
In this Part, we discuss the implementation of the model for protecting
versus exposing private information about public figures based on some of
the famous court decisions which have become foundation stones of the
discourse on public figures.
In Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, a former truck hijacker who was convicted and subsequently rehabilitated for more than ten years sued Reader’s
Digest for invasion of privacy after it published an article about truck hijackings that mentioned his name. Despite having lived an honorable life
for the past decade, the article’s publication of his private details caused the
man’s friends and daughter to scorn and abandon him.143
In Melvin v. Reid, a former prostitute who had been charged with but acquitted of murder sued a film producer. Following her acquittal, she entirely rehabilitated her life by getting married and living an honest and respectable life. However, seven years later, a film was released called “The
Red Kimono,” which presented her story using her real name and the unsavory details about her past from the record of her murder trial. The film,
which was billed as a true story, ruined her new life.144
Using the Three Principle Model with the proportionality rule in both
cases would have brought a different and a better solution. To implement
the model with the proportionality rule test, one would have to start with
identifying the purpose of exposing the information. Then the next step
would be to check if there are alternative, less invasive means to satisfy the
same purpose. If the alternative means serves the same purpose, it should
be used because it will allow for at least some amount of privacy.
In Melvin, the purpose of the film was to: (1) present an incredible story
using creative means and (2) present a true story. These two purposes
could have easily been achieved by telling the audience it was a true story
or that the film was based on a true story without using anyone’s real name.
In the Briscoe case, however, because it was a criminal offence, we think
142
143
144

See id. (examining multiple cases of journalists’ treatment of juvenile sexual assault victims and
providing guidance on how journalists should treat such subjects).
Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc, 483 P.2d 34, 36 (Cal. 1971).
Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 91, 93 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
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there was no other way to achieve the purpose of warning the public besides exposing the details of the person.145 Therefore, based on our proposed model, the publication was justified. We argue that when the common desire of the public is merely to learn intimate, private information
about a person, but the information does not carry any valuable influence
over the person looking for the information, publication of private information about public figures will not be justified. Instead, the public figure
serves as an object to entertain the public with his or her most personal data. Within this category we can find mere curiosity, snooping, gossip, or
perverted behavior.
Another case that might have reached a different decision had the court
used the principles of our model is Friedan v. Friedan.146 Our model, although not dealing with future public figures directly, does not void the possibility of exposing private information about future public figures as well as
about third parties connected to future public figures. Applying our model
to the facts of Friedan, being married to someone who would become a public figure in the future exposed the family member to the status of a public
figure with risks of losing privacy with respect to the relationship, if the information contributes to the public knowledge and access to knowledge.
However, a picture of a family is not information that should contribute to
public welfare. On the other hand if, for example, past spousal violence
against a feminist activist is involved, the information is important per the
criteria of our proposed model.147
One more example of an analysis of the legitimacy of public exposure
according to our model, which differs from the traditional views of the
courts (even though reaching the same result), is the famous Supreme Court
decision on the case of the Hill family.148 In Time, Inc. v. Hill, the “public
figures” at issue were one-time, past, temporary victims who unwillingly became public figures. Our model does not undermine the usual definitions,
but our focus is different. Our model examines the relevancy and legitimacy of the private information. In this case, Time, Inc., as publisher of Life
Magazine, was sued by the Hill family. The five children of the Hill family
were involuntarily held as prisoners by three escaped convicts for nineteen

145
146

147

148

One can claim that both Briscoe and Melvin were criminal offenses. The only difference is that he
was found guilty and she was not.
414 F. Supp. 77, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that the publication of a man’s name and picture in
an article by his ex-wife is not actionable under the New York Civil Rights Act because matters of
public interest “may and often do involve wholly private individuals”).
See id. at 78–79 (explaining that the husband of Betty Friedan was declared a public figure twenty-five years before she became famous as a feminist leader; therefore he lost a suit challenging an
article she had published describing her life with him as connubial and posting a picture of him
from the past).
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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hours on September 11–12, 1952.149 They were released unharmed, and
became the subjects of front-page news. The drama and publicity caused
them to suffer, so they moved away to another place. At about the same
time (1953), Joseph Hayes wrote a novel titled The Desperate Hours, which
was a bestseller and later was made into a Broadway play, which was the
subject of a feature story in Life Magazine.150 Mr. Hill brought a libel
claim against Life Magazine arguing that Time, Inc. violated the family’s
privacy and falsely reported that the new play portrayed an experience suffered by Hill and his family. The article appeared in 1955, entitled “True
Crime Inspires Tense Play,” claiming that the play was based on the experiences of the Hill family during their period of captivity in their home.151
The article included pictures of the play’s main actor in the Hill’s prior
home. Hill won at the lower court and was awarded $75,000 (later reduced
to $30,000).152 Time, Inc. appealed to the Supreme Court, where Richard
Nixon represented the Hill family.153 The publisher claimed that the subject reflected a “legitimate news interest,” meaning “a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.” At the time of publication,
the publisher claimed, it was “published in good faith without any malice
whatsoever.”154 The Court wrote that
guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or
comment about public affairs . . . . We have no doubt that the subject of the
Life article . . . is a matter of public interest. “The line between the informing
and the entertaining is too elusive for protection of . . . [freedom of the
press].”155

The Court concluded that errors by negligence are protected by freedom of
expression.156
Justice Harlan—dissenting in part—noted that the members of the Hill
family were not public officials but individuals that came to public attention
through unfortunate circumstances, not by making voluntary actions, and
thus cannot be considered as having waived state protection from irresponsible publicity. Justice Harlan contended that “the press should have a duty
of making a reasonable investigation of the underlying facts and [should]
limit[ ] itself to ‘fair comment’ on the material gathered . . . . [S]uch a rule

149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id. at 378.
Id.
Id. at 377.
Id. at 379.
Id. at 375.
Id. at 378–79.
Id. at 388 (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)).
See id. at 389 (“In this context, sanctions against either innocent or negligent misstatement would
present a grave hazard of discouraging the press from exercising the constitutional guarantees.”).
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might slightly limit press discussion of matters touching individuals like Mr.
Hill.”157
An analysis of the case according to our model raises different issues.
The case does not meet the first test: the relevancy of the information of the
public making decisions about the public figure, but meets the second test,
in offering important life ideas of cultural merit. Implementing the third
criterion of proportionality leaves us with the impression that too many private details were unnecessarily exposed beyond the data reasonably needed
to justify the goals of our model.
The Supreme Court has not thought about the Internet when shaping
its tests about public figures. “[T]he instances of truly involuntary public
figures must be exceedingly rare.”158 However, in the age of smartphones,
Facebook, and YouTube, privacy on the one hand may seem like a thing of
the past, but on the other hand, we see an amplified need for protection of
privacy. In his book Balancing Privacy and Free Speech: Unwanted Attention in the
Age of Social Media, Mark Tunick addresses the ethical and legal questions
that arise when media technology is used to give individuals unwanted attention.159 In many cases, privacy interests can outweigh society’s interest
in free speech and access to information. Based on Jeremy Waldron’s political theory concerning tolerance, Tunick argues that we can “have a legitimate interest in controlling the extent to which information about us is disseminated.”160 By addressing the debate about the right to be forgotten,
Tunick discusses the cost of free speech and legal tools needed to develop
new social attitudes towards privacy.161 For example, he advises revising
the code of ethics for professional journalists and the media, “to
acknowledge the need to be more sensitive to the privacy [issues and] interests at stake when information that is [considered] public [because it is] accessible to some [people and] is [then] made readily . . . [available] to a
much broader audience . . . . [S]elf-regulation by . . . the media [alone] is
unlikely to result in a fair balancing of interests.”162 Technology today
“makes it possible for anyone to share information [(whether true or false)]
widely with a click of a button [and] little incentive to think
about . . . consequences.” Legal remedies and punishments can make peo-

157
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Id. at 409 (Harlen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
TUNICK, supra note 139.
Id. at i.
See id. at 193–207 (arguing that even in a society where a majority of people do not strongly value
privacy, the majority should be sensitive to the interests of those who do).
See id. at 193 (“. . . self-regulation by journalists and the media is unlikely to itself result in a fair
balancing of the interests.”).
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ple think carefully before clicking the button.163 The law in the U.S. could
conceivably “be reformed to compel companies like [Google] or Facebook
to remove offensive material when they are made aware of it, though that
would create the problem of how one determines if a request is reasonable.” As another example, “Daniel Solove recommend[ed] modifying the
Communication Decency Act (CDA) . . . [to provide an] incentive to remove offensive material[s] once they are [made known].”164 Individuals
can have legitimate privacy interests in remaining anonymous in public
places unless there is a compelling interest to share information.165
CONCLUSION
Professor Anita Allen contends that privacy is a “foundational human
good[ ],” one that is essential for a free and democratic society. She argues
that in certain instances, privacy must be mandated: “[F]or the sake of
foundational human goods, liberal societies properly constrain both government coercion and individual choice . . . .”166
The discussion of privacy rights of public figures is currently highly influenced by the digital era for many reasons. Among them is the strong
and wide impact of publication on the Internet as well as the inapplicability
of the right to be forgotten, especially in the light of being a public figure—
a category that was exempted from the right of deleting information even
by the Google Spain Court decision.167 “[D]ue to advancing technology
facilitating the public’s fascination with celebrity, jurisdictions in the United
States and Europe are reinterpreting privacy rights leading to divergent definitions of both public figures and the public interest.”168 As technology be-
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See id. at 194 (discussing both the positives and negatives to how developments in technology impact the privacy of individuals outside of the public sphere, and noting that “it may be harder to
promote compliance with norms if those norms are not supported by the force of law”).
See id. at 199–200 (citing DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 149–60 (2007)) (recounting Daniel Solove’s reasoning for recommending a modification the CDA).
See id. at 200–201 (proposing changes to legislation in order to protect individuals’ privacy interests unless the challenged speech reaches a certain standard of newsworthiness to a specified audience).
ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? 13 (2011).
See Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Case C-131/12, E.C.R., ¶
100(4)
(May
13,
2014)
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&docid=152065 (ruling that an individual has a valid privacy interest in having
their personally identifying information removed from Internet search engines but that it may be
overridden “if it appeared, for particular reasons, such as the role played by the data subject in
public life, that the interference with his fundamental rights is juditified by the preponderant interest of the general public in having . . . access to the information in question”).
Shackelford, supra note 7, at 126 (“. . . potential reasons for this divergence, including the United
States’ deep commitment to free speech, different understandings of the public interest, and, most
critically, varying legal cultures.”).
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comes more advanced, the need to protect one’s right to privacy become
increasingly important.
In this paper we drew a model based on the balloon theoretical justification to privacy. The model was written about public figures but can be
used in other cases, such as with women or children’s privacy. Our model
will allow privacy rights to be interfered with only when justified under the
Three Principle Filtering Model.
Many questions remain open to future studies and discussions. One
very important matter for policy makers to address will be the question of
who will judge and decide.
A professional resource for journalists, when discussing issues of privacy
and public interest, concludes that “there is often no clear-cut distinction between right and wrong. We can give some general guidance and suggest a
few rules, but [the journalist] will have to decide what to do case-by-case.”169
We hope that our Three Principle Filtering Model will help not only
journalists but also judges and other policy makers to make structured, informed, and legitimate decisions when addressing publication of private information in regards to public figures.

169

The News Manual, A Professional Resource For Journalists and Public Interest, Chapter 62: Privacy
and
Public
Interest
(2008),
http://www.thenewsmanual.net/Manuals
%20Volume%203/volume3_62.htm.
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